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Executive summary
In this deliverable, relevant secure composition policies are identified in web
mashup applications and are described in more detail.
As a first step, to better understand the impact of running arbitrary
JavaScript code, the upcoming HTML5 specification and accompanying APIs
have been studied, and a list of security-sensitive operations available to
mashup components has been enumerated (Section 2). This includes, among
others, access to sensitive information in the DOM, the history and cookies,
sensitive device information, inter-frame communication, cross-domain com-
munication, and various features in media, UI, and rendering. This list of
security-sensitive operations is a key ingredient in defining privileges granted
to mashup components as part of the secure composition policies.
Next, the seven most relevant composition scenarios selected from deliv-
erable D1.2 (i.e. Google Maps, Facebook application, Online advertisement,
Interactive Avatar, third-party payment, third-party authentication and the
Holiday Picture mashup), are described in more detail in Section 3. In ad-
dition to the informal functional description, the relevant technical data on
how the scenario is constructed is described, as well as an analysis of security
requirements for the particular scenario.
In Section 4, two types of secure composition policies are developed.
These policies include both behavioural constraints as well as communication
constraints. First, the least-privilege composition policy enables the specifi-
cation of allowed privileges granted to a mashup component. The privileges
consist of the 86 previously identified security-sensitive operations, grouped
in 9 separate categories. Second, to capture recurring communication pat-
terns between cooperative mashup components (as is the case in third party
payment as well as in third party authentication compositions), the more
fine-grained trusted delegation policy between cooperative components spec-
ifies how an integrator can securely delegate control back and forth to a
third-party mashup component (e.g. for 3rd party payment). In addition,
the two policy types are applied on the seven small composition scenarios.
Finally, various implementation strategies have been explored to early
test the implementation feasibility of the two types of secure composition
policies, including the use of JavaScript wrappers, deep aspect technology in
the JavaScript engine, as well as browser extensions (Section 5).
The collection of small composition scenarios, the concrete composition
policies and the early exploration of implementation strategies are direct
input for the server-driven enforcement in WP4, and their characteristics
will further drive the selection and development of enforcement techniques.
The composition policies and enforcement techniques presented in this
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deliverable have also been described in [19] (accepted at ACSAC 2011), [4]
(presented at ESORICS 2011), [9] (presented at NordSec 2010), and [10]
(presented at CSF 2011). For a more detailed description of the presented
work we would like to refer to these papers.
FP7-ICT-2009-5
Project No. 256964
D4.1: Secure composition policies 4/73
Contents
1 Introduction 7
2 Security-sensitive operations 10
2.1 Window and Sandbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Inter-window Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 External Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Client-side storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Device access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6 Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7 UI & rendering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Secure composition requirements 16
3.1 Google Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.2 Technical description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Facebook application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.2 Technical description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3 Online advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.2 Technical description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4 Interactive Avatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4.2 Technical description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.5 Third-Party Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5.2 Technical description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.6 Third-Party Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6.2 Technical description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.6.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.7 Holiday Pictures Mashup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.7.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.7.2 Technical description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
FP7-ICT-2009-5
Project No. 256964
D4.1: Secure composition policies 5/73
3.7.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 Secure composition policies 37
4.1 Least-privilege composition policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1.1 Least-privilege composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1.2 Composition policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2 Trusted delegation policy between cooperative components . . 41
4.2.1 Basic policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.2 Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.3 Filtering algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.4 Experimental validation of the policy . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.5 Formal Modeling and Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 Secure composition policies for the seven composition scenarios 48
4.3.1 Google Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.2 Facebook application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.3 Online Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3.4 Interactive Avatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3.5 Third-Party Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3.6 Third-Party Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.7 Holiday Pictures Mashup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Secure Composition for Information Flow Policies . . . . . . . 53
5 Implementation strategies 54
5.1 WebJail: least-privilege implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.1.1 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.1.2 Prototype implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2 Trusted delegation implementation as an extension to CsFire . 59
5.3 Safe Wrappers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.3.1 Declarative Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.4 Two-Tier Sandbox Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6 Conclusion 69
References 70
FP7-ICT-2009-5
Project No. 256964
D4.1: Secure composition policies 6/73
List of Figures
1 Synthesized model of the emerging HTML5 specifications . . . 10
2 Example of Google Maps integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Annotated sourcecode of the Google Maps example: API script
inclusion in the red rectangle, gluecode in the blue triangle,
the div element in the green triangle. This sourcecode can
be found on http://gmaps-samples.googlecode.com/svn/
trunk/geocoder/singlegeocode.html . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4 Example of a Facebook application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Diagram of the HTTP calls made during the serverside flow
of the Facebook authentication process (Source: https://
developers.facebook.com/docs/authentication/) . . . . . 22
6 Diagram of the HTTP calls made during the clientside flow
of the Facebook authentication process (Source: https://
developers.facebook.com/docs/authentication/) . . . . . 23
7 Sample of various ad types. A webmail application with (1)
banner and (2) skyscraper ads. Also illustrated are (3) an in-
line text and (4) a floating ad. (Example taken from AdJail [18]) 24
8 Example of an interactive avatar drawing tool component . . . 26
9 Composition with Third-Party Payment provider . . . . . . . 28
10 Third-Party Payment Workflow Overview (PayPal) . . . . . . 30
11 Third-Party Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
12 Third-Party Authentication Workflow Overview (Shibboleth) . 32
13 Holiday pictures mashup example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
14 Holiday pictures mashup: interactions between gluecode, com-
ponents and browser functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
15 EBNF notation of the policy syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
16 The request filtering algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
17 Complex cross-origin redirect scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
18 Step-by-step flow diagram for third-party payment . . . . . . . 50
19 Step-by-step flow diagram for third-party authentication . . . 51
20 The WebJail architecture consists of three layers: The pol-
icy layer, the advice construction layer and the deep aspect
weaving layer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
21 Example advice function construction and weaving . . . . . . 56
22 Schematic view of deep aspect weaving. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
23 Illustration of policy parameter manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 64
24 The two-tier architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
FP7-ICT-2009-5
Project No. 256964
D4.1: Secure composition policies 7/73
1 Introduction
The idea behind a web mashup is to integrate several web applications (com-
ponents) and mash up their code, data and results. The result is a new web
application that is more useful than the sum of its parts. Several publicly
available web applications [16] provide APIs that allow them to be used as
third-party components for web mashups.
To build a client-side mashup, an integrator selects the relevant in-house
and third-party components, and provides the necessary glue code on an
integrating web page to retrieve the third-party components from their re-
spective service providers and let them interact and collaborate with each
other.
Mashup security is based on the de facto security policy of the Web: the
Same Origin Policy (SOP) [41]. The SOP states that scripts from one origin
should not be able to access content from other origins. This prevents scripts
from stealing data, cookies or login credentials from other sites. Additionally
to the SOP, browsers also apply a frame navigation policy, which restricts
the navigation of frames to its descendants [2].
The two most-widespread techniques to integrate third party components
into a web mashup are through script inclusion or via (sandboxed) iframe-
integration. Loading components from different origins in iframes causes
them to be separated by the SOP. Using script inclusion causes the script
to be loaded in the protection domain of the including page, which is a
straightforward way to achieve interaction between components. Communi-
cation with the origin of the page containing the script can be achieved using
the XMLHttpRequest object of the JavaScript language.
Script inclusion HTML script tags are used to execute JavaScript while
a webpage is loading. This JavaScript code can be located on a different
server than the webpage it is executing in. When executing, the browser will
treat the code as if it originated from the same origin as the webpage itself,
without any restrictions of the Same-Origin Policy.
The included code executes in the same JavaScript context, has access
to the code of the integrating webpage and all of its datastructures. All
sensitive JavaScript operations available to the integrating webpage are also
available to the integrated component.
(Sandboxed) iframe integration HTML iframe tags allow a web de-
veloper to include one document inside another. The integrated document
is loaded in its own environment almost as if it were loaded in a separate
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browser window. The advantage of using an iframe in a mashup is that the
integrated component from another origin is isolated from the integrating
webpage via the Same-Origin Policy. However, the code running inside of
the iframe still has access to all of the same sensitive JavaScript operations
as the integrating webpage, albeit limited to its own execution context (i.e.
origin). For instance, a third-party component can use local storage APIs,
but only has access to the local storage of its own origin.
HTML 5 provides the “sandbox” attribute for the iframe element, which
disables any security-sensitive feature. Specific features can be allowed by
setting the value of the attribute, such as enabling script execution with the
“allow-scripts” keyword. Obviously, this very coarse-grained control has only
a very limited applicability in a web mashup context.
Examining the traditional techniques in the light of the previously pro-
posed security requirements yields some interesting results. Iframes offer full
separation between different origins, but not within the same origin, and pro-
vide no interaction between components. Script inclusion offers no separation
at all, but provides full interaction. This interaction is not authenticated,
nor can confidentiality or integrity be ensured.
As discussed in deliverable D.1.1 [39], to cope with the hybrid aggrega-
tion of content and functionality from different trust domains and the ensu-
ing fragmentation of ownership, web mashups demand stronger separation
guarantees, but also require the possibility of interaction between separated
components. This includes among others inter-component behavioral re-
strictions (e.g. a least-privilege execution of third party components), secure
cross-component interactions and secure remote communication.
One of the main challenges for the secure composition is the need to sup-
port fine-grained, expressive composition policies at the server-side. These
policies needs to be at the right level of abstraction for the application devel-
oper or composer and need to control all relevant security-sensitive operations
as well as cross-component and remote communication. To do so, it is im-
portant that the composition of the different components is made explicit,
and that policies of the different stakeholders can be specified in terms of the
components or their composition.
In this deliverable, relevant secure composition policies are identified in
web mashup applications and are described in more detail. To do so, ex-
isting and emerging web standards are studied to understand the impact of
running arbitrary JavaScript code, and to identify and enumerate the set of
operations available to mashup components (Section 2). Next, for the seven
most relevant composition scenarios, the scenario description and the secu-
rity requirements has been described in detail (Section 3), and expressed as a
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secure composition policy (Section 4). These policies include both behavioral
constraints as well as communication constraints. Finally, we have explored
and experimented with various implementation strategies to acquire first in-
sights in their feasibility and complexity (Section 5). The collection of small
composition scenarios, the concrete composition policies and the early ex-
ploration of implementation strategies are direct input for the server-driven
enforcement in WP4, and their characteristics will further drive the selection
and development of enforcement techniques.
The composition policies and enforcement techniques presented in this
deliverable have also been described in [19] (accepted at ACSAC 2011), [4]
(presented at ESORICS 2011), [9] (presented at NordSec 2010), and [10]
(presented at CSF 2011). For a more detailed description of the presented
work we would like to refer to these papers.
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2 Security-sensitive operations
The impact of running arbitrary JavaScript code in an insecure mashup
composition is equivalent to acquiring XSS capabilities, either in the con-
text of the component’s origin, or in the context of the integrator. For
instance, a malicious third-party component provider can invoke typical
security-sensitive operations such as the retrieval of cookies, navigation of
the browser to another page, launch of external requests or access and up-
dates to the Document Object Model (DOM).
However, with the emerging HTML5 specification and APIs[27], the im-
pact of injecting and executing arbitrary JavaScript has massively increased.
Recently, JavaScript APIs have been proposed to access geolocation infor-
mation and system information (such as CPU load and ambient sensors), to
capture audio and video, to store and retrieve data from a client-side data-
store, to communicate between windows as well as with remote servers. As
a result, executing arbitrary JavaScript becomes much more attractive to
attackers, even if the JavaScript execution is restricted to the origin of the
component, or a unique origin in case of a sandbox.
We have analyzed the emerging specifications and browser implemen-
tations, and have identified 86 security-sensitive operations, accessible via
JavaScript APIs. We have synthesized the newly-added features of these
specifications in Figure 1, and we will briefly summarize each of the compo-
nents in the next paragraphs. Most of these features rely on (some form of)
user-consent and/or have origin-restrictions in place.
This list of security-sensitive operations plays an important role in defin-
ing least-privilege policies for mashup component, as will be done in Section 4.
Figure 1: Synthesized model of the emerging HTML5 specifications
Central in the model is the window concept, containing the document.
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The window manifests itself as a browser window, a tab, a popup or a frame,
and provides access to the location and history, event handlers, the doc-
ument and its associated DOM tree and numerous client-side APIs. The
functionality offered by the emerging web specifications as JavaScript APIs
is grouped into blocks based on offered functionality, and are depicted around
the window in Figure 1.
2.1 Window and Sandbox
As mentioned before, the browser window and its associated window object
enclose a document with a specific origin and location (a URL). A window
can contain multiple documents (i.e. a browsing history) but only one of
these documents can be active at any given time. Since the relation between
window and document at one moment in time is one-to-one, we do not sep-
arate a window and a document when this is not relevant. Additionally, a
sandbox[7] (shown by the dotted line in the model) can impose coarse-grained
restrictions on an iframe, as mentioned in Section 1.
The two functional blocks inside the window (Event Handlers and DOM)
represent two cornerstone pieces of functionality for dynamic web pages.
Event handlers are used extensively to register handlers for a specific event,
such as receiving messages from other windows or being notified of mouse
clicks. Access to the DOM enables a script to read or modify the document’s
structure on the fly.
2.2 Inter-window Communication
An important aspect of composed applications is communication between
several windows (e.g. sending messages between mashup components). This
functional block covers window navigation and the corresponding policy, the
descendant policy (HTML5). Additionally, this block includes message pass-
ing as defined by the Web Messaging specification.
The Web Messaging[28] specification defines two mechanisms for commu-
nicating between browsing contexts in HTML documents: cross-document
messaging and channel messaging. The former sends a message in the form
of a single asynchronous event. The latter opens a channel between two con-
texts, allowing the asynchronous posting and receiving of messages through
the channel. Both mechanisms allow the passing of messages of any type,
but every message is cloned before it is sent.
Cross-document messaging[6] allows scripts to post messages to another
window. The posting of a message with the postMessage operation requires
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the specification of the target origin, which can either be a URI, a wildcard
(*) or the current origin (/).
Channel messaging creates two ports, of which one needs to be transferred
to the remote browsing context. Ports can be passed between a context
using the postMessage mechanism on a window object (as used in cross-
document messaging). Message ports belonging to the same channel remain
entangled, thus effectively creating a channel with two endpoints. Messages
can be sent over message ports using the postMessage mechanism on a port
object. Note that the latter postMessage mechanism no longer requires the
explicit specification of a destination origin. After use, ports should be closed
explicitly to avoid needless resource consumption.
2.3 External Communication
An interactive client-side web page often requires to communicate with re-
mote parties, for example to load contacts from an address book. This block
covers the specification of XMLHttpRequest and the WebSocket API, mech-
anisms to communicate, and new policies to enable secure cross-origin com-
munication (CORS and UMP).
The XMLHttpRequest[36] specification defines an API that provides scripted
client functionality for transferring data between a client and a server. It
offers scripts the possibility to initiate HTTP requests and process the re-
sponses. The XHR specification has evolved over time, which is why there
is a Level 1 and Level 2 version. Level 1 offers same-origin communication,
while level 2 extends the functionality towards cross-origin communication.
The WebSocket API[35] specification enables two-way communication
with a remote host over a single HTTP connection. Using regular HTTP
connections, e.g. when using XMLHttpRequests, the client must setup a
new connection to the remote host for every message sent. The WebSocket
API defines a way to keep the HTTP channel open and transmit/receive any
number of messages while the channel is open.
CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing)[21] defines a mechanism to enable
client-side cross-origin requests. CORS only defines algorithms which can be
followed by an implementing API, such as XMLHttpRequest Level 2[37]. The
main idea behind the specification is that a client provides the server with
adequate information to decide whether the requesting origin has access to
the requested data or not. This decision is sent to the client, which effectively
enforces this decision by either granting or denying access to the requested
resource.
UMP (Unified Messaging Policy)[32] enables cross-site messaging while
avoiding attacks abusing cookies and other credentials. UMP allows the
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resource owner to consent to cross-origin retrieval and enforces origin inde-
pendent messaging. This is realized using a uniform request and a uniform
response. A uniform request is a fully anonymized GET or POST request
that does not contain any authentication information and has specific char-
acteristics with regard to its content-type and headers. Likewise, a uniform
response must also adhere to certain characteristics. A non-uniform response
as an answer to a uniform request must be met by an error. It must not be
made available to the requesting node and if it is a redirect, it must not be
followed.
2.4 Client-side storage
The client-side storage specifications enable applications to temporarily or
persistently store data in the client-side environment. One example is a
calendar application which stores a copy of your calendar at the client-side.
Various specifications are emerging, including Web Storage, IndexedDB and
the File API.
The Web Storage API[34] provides each origin its separate client-side
storage area for key-value pairs, similar to the cookie mechanism. A valid
key is any string, including the empty string. A valid value is any piece
of data supported by the structured clone algorithm. Each value is cloned
when storing it and is cloned when retrieving it. Modifying the storage
(setItem, removeItem, clear) also triggers a storage event to all documents
that have a reference to this particular storage instance. The event contains
the information about the change.
Web Storage supports two different storage areas: localStorage and ses-
sionStorage. Local storage is persistent storage with no limited lifetime.
Session storage is meant to support concurrent transactions in separate win-
dows, a case that cookies do not support.
The Indexed Database API[29] provides a system to store (key,value)
pairs in a persistent database. The database records are indexed and can be
retrieved either by their index or by their key.
The File API[22] allows a web developer to represent, select, read and
write file objects through a scripted interface on the client side. The data in
each file can be accessed at a byte-level.
2.5 Device access
Several specifications introduce new APIs to retrieve client-side information,
such as contextual data (e.g. geolocation) as well as system/device properties
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such as battery level, CPU information and ambient sensors (light, sound,
movement, ...).
The Geolocation API[23] provides scripted access to current geograph-
ical location information associated with the hosting device. Geolocation
offers both “one-shot” location information or repeated monitoring of loca-
tion changes. The API is agnostic of the underlying location mechanism (e.g.
GPS, network-based) and provides no guarantees about the accuracy of the
location.
The System Information API[31] provides web applications with access
to various properties of the system on which they are running, as typically
available to an operating system. Examples are CPU properties, audio/video
codecs or different sensors (ambient light, ambient noise, temperature, ...).
The API offers one-shot access and continued monitoring, which can be can-
celed by the user. Currently, only reading information is supported, but a
future version may offer write-support.
2.6 Media
New media features enable a web application to play audio and video frag-
ments, as well as capture audio and video via a microphone or webcam.
A media element (audio or video) can be used to embed a video or audio
object in the web page [26]. Pages can script their own controls for the
stream, and the interface of media elements offers origin-independent access
to the controls and the stream’s properties, such as playback information
(e.g. the timeranges of the video that have actually been rendered).
The Media Capture API[30] provides programmatic access to audio, im-
age and video capabilities of the device (via the microphone and webcam).
Scripts can issue capture operations that are invoked asynchronously and
return their result using a success or error callback handler. The actual cap-
turing is handled by an external application that is part of the browser or
the underlying platform. The API does not allow live capturing, as needed
in interactive applications (e.g.video chat, ...).
2.7 UI & rendering
In addition to the obvious rendering of documents, the browser also enables
the user to interact with the web application in numerous ways (mouse move-
ment, entering text with the keyboard, entering new URLs, using the back
and forward button, ...). Newly-added features are the use of drag-and-drop,
the History Interface, Clipboard API and Web Notifications.
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In HTML5, elements can use the draggable[24] attribute to indicate they
can be dragged and the dropzone attribute to indicate they can receive drop
events. The appropriate actions can be implemented using handlers for the
different drag/drop events. The data involved in the drag and drop operation
is stored in the drag data store. Drag and drop is also supported from external
sources (e.g. dragging files from your desktop to a web page).
Furthermore, each browsing context has a distinct session history, that
consists of a sequence of documents. One of the documents of the session
history is known as the current entry. The history interface[25] allows via
a JavaScript API to jump backwards and forwards, and to add and update
history state.
The Clipboard API and events[20] provide programmatic access to clip-
board operations such as copy, cut and paste.
Web Notifications[33] are simple notifications generated to alert the user
of a webpage, and are displayed either on the webpage itself, inside the
chrome of the webbrowser or even outside of the webbrowser.
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3 Secure composition requirements
From the scenarios listed in deliverable D1.2 [40], the seven most represen-
tative composition scenarios for WP4 are described in more detail in this
section:
1. Google Maps
2. Facebook Application
3. Online Advertising
4. Interactive Avatar
5. Third-party Payment
6. Third-party Authentication
7. Holiday Pictures Mashup
The Google Maps scenario is often pointed to as the de facto example of
mashup composition. It illustrates the use of a service API and integration
via script inclusion. The Facebook Application scenario on the other hand is a
very popular example of mashup integration via iframes. Another widespread
example of third-party composition is the inclusion of online advertising on
websites. Next, the interactive avatar scenario explores the use of novel UI
and rendering techniques in community, as will they possibly emerge in the
near future. Additionally, the third-party payment and third-party authen-
tication scenario were added to investigate more complex communication
interactions between cooperative mashup components. Finally, the Holiday
Pictures Mashup integrates service APIs from multiple service providers into
a single application, and was added to explore secure composition policies
for mashup compositions with multiple parties involved.
For each of the scenarios, a brief summary is given of the functional
scenario, followed by a more technical description how components are loaded
and combined in the composition scenarios. Finally, for each scenario an
informal requirements analysis describes the stakeholders involved as well as
meaningful security requirements and informal policies.
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3.1 Google Maps
Figure 2: Example of Google Maps integration
3.1.1 General description
Google Maps (GMaps) is the most commonly used API in mashups[16]. In
this scenario, the map functionality offered by Google is combined with
application-specific data, such as geometric coordinates, points-of-interest,
moving GPS coordinates, or custom overlays. This data is either directly
available for the integrator, or is in its turn received from a third-party ser-
vice provider.
The scenario runs as follows. A user is invited to enter the name of a
location. This name is then looked up in the Google Geocoding API and
a set of GPS coordinates is returned. Using the GMaps API, a marker is
then positioned at these coordinates on the map. Multiple queries can be
performed in sequence and the previous markers are not erased.
3.1.2 Technical description
This mashup consists of a single component (the GMaps API) and some glue
code, as illustrated in the annotated example code in Figure 3.
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To make use of GMaps, the integrating webpage needs to load a JavaScript
library using a script tag (highlighted in red in Figure 3). The JavaScript
library is located at http://maps.google.com/maps/api/js. Next, the de-
veloper must include a div element with a specific id in the integrating page
(highlighted in green in Figure 3) and pass that id to the GMaps API. The
GMaps code will then be able use that div element to load its maps and
interact with the user. Finally, the API can be used to navigate the map,
place markers, draw polygons, . . . etc. An example of such glue code is
illustrated in the blue rectangle of Figure 3)
The glue code contained in the integrating webpage is used to initialize the
GMaps API and to tie an event handler to an input field in a form. The form
with the input field is where the user can enter a query. On submission of this
form, the event handler is called. The event handler launches a geocoding
query to translate the user input into GPS coordinates. These coordinates
are then fed into the GMaps API and a marker is placed on the map.
The combination of GMaps service API and client-side code can either
run directly in the (outermost) document (i.e. mashup integrator document),
or can be combined in a separate iframe. A important challenge when choos-
ing for the ‘script inclusion’ composition type, is that code loaded from the
Google servers will be executed in the same JavaScript context as the in-
tegrating page. While Google can (arguably) be trusted to behave, parties
may become less trusted over time, or APIs may get compromised at some
point in time. Moreover, this composition scenario is just particular instance
of a widely class of script inclusion scenarios.
3.1.3 Requirements
This mashup requires the ability to contact the remote GMaps and geocoding
APIs, it must be able to write to the div element provided by the developer
and be able to interact with the user through the form input field and mouse
events.
More concrete, this mashup consists of gluecode written by the integrator
and the service API of GMaps. The gluecode must be able to execute an
eventhandler when input from the textfield is entered. It must then be able
to launch an XMLHttpRequest towards the Geocoding API and read back
the response, which is a set of GPS coordinates. When received, the GPS
coordinates must be handed over to the GMaps component, which either
requires access to the GMaps component’s DOM to call a function, or, if
using GMaps in an iframe, requires sending an inter-frame message using
e.g. postMessage.
The GMaps service API requires the ability to communicate with Google
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Figure 3: Annotated sourcecode of the Google Maps example: API
script inclusion in the red rectangle, gluecode in the blue trian-
gle, the div element in the green triangle. This sourcecode can be
found on http://gmaps-samples.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/geocoder/
singlegeocode.html
Maps back-end servers to download maptiles and write access to its DIV to
render the maptiles. It also requires the ability to receive mouse- and key-
board events from that DIV. Finally, if rendered in an iframe, the component
should be able to use inter-frame communication to receive GPS coordinates
from the gluecode.
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3.2 Facebook application
Widgets (iGoogle – FacebookApps)  
Social network site     
allows client to integrate 
widgets, e.g. a virtual pet
The virtual pet widget 
can draw on a canvas, 
uses timer for animation     
The user can interact 
with the widget, by 
li ki h i dc c ng,  over ng an  
dragging the mouse in 
the canvas
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Figure 4: Example of a Facebook application
3.2.1 General description
Facebook is an online social networking site with more than 750 million active
users as of July 2011. Third-party application developers can create applica-
tions and integrate them with Facebook to make use of Facebook’s userbase.
Facebook applications can use Facebook’s Graph API to retrieve informa-
tion about Facebook users, like personal information, friend list, photo’s and
messages, . . . .
In the past, there were two ways to create Facebook applications: inte-
grating it in an iframe, or writing it in FBML (Facebook markup language).
Applications created in FBML were displayed to the end-user as if they were
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hosted on the Facebook servers. To avoid security problems, these applica-
tions were not allowed to use regular JavaScript, but rather use a restricted
subset of JavaScript called FBJS (Facebook JavaScript). Recently, Facebook
has deprecated this approach and no longer allows new applications in FBML.
All new Facebook applications must be hosted externally and integrated into
Facebook with iframes.
The scenario described here is that of a generic Facebook application
making use of the Graph API, but we will consider 2 toy examples so that
discussion later on is not too abstract: an application using geolocation, and
another using audiovisual media.
3.2.2 Technical description
A Facebook application is hosted on a third-party server and rendered in
a frame on a Facebook page. The application loads pieces of JavaScript
code containing Facebook’s API code, using script tags. These APIs allow
the application to contact Facebook and request information on the visiting
Facebook user.
To make use of a user’s profile information, a Facebook application must
be authorized. Authorization of Facebook applications is based on OAuth
2.0 and comes in 2 flows: server-side or authentication code flow, and client-
side or implicit flow. The former is used when access to the Graph API is
needed from the server-side (e.g. using PHP) and the latter when such access
is needed from the client-side (e.g. using JavaScript).
Server-side flow The server-side flow, depicted in Figure 5, works like this:
When a Facebook users visits an application (YourApp) integrated in Face-
book, YourApp is displayed in an iframe on facebook.com. The first GET
request to YourApp in the iframe will trigger a redirect from YourApp to the
Facebook OAuth login page. The Facebook URL that YourApp redirects to,
contains client_id, the application identifier and redirect_uri, the YourApp
URL that Facebook should redirect to once authentication is complete.
1 https : //www. facebook . com/ d i a l o g /oauth ? c l i e n t_ id=YOUR_APP_ID
2 &red i r e c t_u r i=YOUR_URL
On the Facebook login page, 2 steps are performed. First, the user is
authenticated in case he is not logged in to Facebook. Second, Facebook dis-
plays an authorization page listing the permissions that YourApp requires,
and asks the user for approval. After this authentication and authorization
step, Facebook generates an authorization code and appends it as the code
parameter to YOUR_URL, the URL previously received in the redirect_uri pa-
rameter.
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Figure 5: Diagram of the HTTP calls made during the serverside flow of the
Facebook authentication process (Source: https://developers.facebook.
com/docs/authentication/)
1 http ://YOUR_URL? code=A_CODE_GENERATED_BY_SERVER
At this point, the server-side YourApp application can use the autho-
rization code in combination with its app secret to request an access token
from the Facebook servers. Using this access token, YourApp can access the
user’s profile using the Graph API. This access token will expire after a spec-
ified amount of time, after which YourApp can request a new access token.
To receive an access token with an infinite expire time, the oﬄine_access
permissions must be granted to YourApp.
Client-side flow The client-side flow, depicted in Figure 6, is similar to
the server-side flow. The user is redirected to the same login page, but an
extra parameter response_type is set to token to identify the type of response
that is expected:
1 https : //www. facebook . com/ d i a l o g /oauth ? c l i e n t_ id=YOUR_APP_ID
2 &red i r e c t_u r i=YOUR_URL
3 &response_type=token
After authentication and authorization, the user is also redirected towards
YOUR_URL, but the code parameter containing the authorization code is not
appended. Instead, the access token is appended as a fragment identifier:
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Figure 6: Diagram of the HTTP calls made during the clientside flow of the
Facebook authentication process (Source: https://developers.facebook.
com/docs/authentication/)
1 http ://YOUR_URL#access_token=166942940015970%7C2 . sa0
2 &exp i re s_in=64090}
Because access token is passed in a fragment identifier, only client-side
code can access it. The access token can be used from the client-side directly,
or it can be passed to the server-side.
3.2.3 Requirements
This scenario has 3 security stakeholders: Facebook, the third-party applica-
tion provider and the end-user. The application is rendered in an iframe, so
most security problems are avoided because of the same-origin policy. Besides
requiring access to its own DOM, the application also requires the ability to
receive keyboard and mouse events, and should be allowed to communicate
out-of-band with Facebook APIs.
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3.3 Online advertisingAdvertisements
12
Example from: AdJail: Practical Enforcement of Confidentiality and Integrity Policies onWeb
Advertisements, Mike Ter Louw Karthik Thotta Ganesh V.N. Venkatakrishnan, USENIX SEC 2010
, 
Figure 7: Sample of various ad types. A webmail application with (1) banner
and (2) skyscraper ads. Also illustrat d ar (3) an inli text and (4) a
floating ad. (Example taken from AdJail [18])
3.3.1 General description
Online advertising is a multi-billion dollar per year business, where orga-
nizations (advertisers) attempt to attract more customers to their business
by displaying advertisements (ads) on popular third-party websites (adver-
tisement publishers). Typically, this is achieved through an advertisement
network, which provides the technology to display the ads on publisher web-
pages and also handles the buying and selling of ad space and ads. Examples
of such advertisement networks are Google Adwords, Adbrite, DoubleClick,
Zedo, . . . etc. Over the years, a lot of ad types have been invented: banners
(text, graphical and rich media), pop-ups and pop-unders, overlays, skin-
ning, page pushers, . . . etc. Through the use of JavaScript, these ads can be
made aware of the webpage that incorporates them and alter their behavior
based on the content of this page. This contextual advertising technique is
very interesting to advertisers because it helps them to better target their
customer groups.
The most popular online ad formats according to the 2010 report from
IAB [8] are ‘Search’ (Listing an advertiser’s company in search results) and
‘Display/Banner’ (The typical ad banners). The ad considered in this sce-
nario is a typical contextual ad that displays a graphical or rich media banner
on a webpage.
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3.3.2 Technical description
The ad in this scenario is integrated on the website by including a piece of
third-party JavaScript. This script analyzes the contents of the webpage for
keywords in order to provide a contextual ad, The result of this analysis is
transmitted to an ad network which returns a piece of JavaScript that needs
to be written to the webpage and executed. This last piece of JavaScript
contains the actual ad banner. It could be a graphical banner, an animated
image or a flash application in an iframe.
3.3.3 Requirements
There are 3 security stakeholders in this mashup: the ad network, the ad
publisher and the end-user. The integrating webpage must allow read- and
write-access to parts of its DOM to the ad. In particular, the ad needs write
access to write and update the part of the DOM where the ad is integrated,
and the ad script may need to retrieve context information to select the
most appropriate ad (e.g. access to meta-tags and keywords or even to the
full webpage). If the ad is executed and rendered in an iframe, this implies
inter-frame communication between the webpage and the ad. The ad must
have the ability to communicate with its ad network, and be able to react to
keyboard- and mouse events from the user.
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3.4 Interactive Avatar
Figure 8: Example of an interactive avatar drawing tool component
3.4.1 General description
Most websites these days offer the visitor the ability to register an account
and interact with other visitors of that website. Good examples of such sites
are forums and blogs, where a registered user is often allowed to post an
entry or a comment. The user is allowed to edit information about himself
into his account details. Besides textual information like location, age, name,
contact information and other, it is usually also possible to upload or select
an avatar image. This avatar image is displayed next to any post the user
makes.
In this scenario, the registered user is allowed to create a more interactive
avatar instead of just a plain image. The avatar can access data about the
user it belongs to and display it. E.g., the avatar can show the current state of
the user is (logged in, editing a post, away, . . . ), and render this information
in an interactive way.
Avatars can be created by the user himself using JavaScript or a subset
of JavaScript. More realistically, a community of avatar-builders could exist
that shares pre-made interactive avatars with other users. In such a case, a
user could select a pre-made avatar from a list instead of creating one from
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scratch. These libraries of avatars can be hosted on the same server where
the user account is registered and used, but it could also be hosted elsewhere.
3.4.2 Technical description
The avatar can be rendered on an HTML5 canvas element, allowing for re-
altime animation and full interaction with visitors. Data about the user can
be retrieved in the background using a local API of the blog/forum or by
using XMLHttpRequests. Avatar code could be included using script tags,
like any other JavaScript code, or loaded inside an iframe.
3.4.3 Requirements
In this scenario, there are 3 security stakeholders: the blog or forum where
the user profile exists, the provider where the avatar code is hosted and
the end-user. The avatar needs to be able to interact with the end-user
through mouse- and keyboard events. It must also be able to write to a
specified location in the DOM to render an image using canvas graphics.
In addition, it should be able to make use of an API on the blog/forum to
request information about the user to which the avatar belongs.
In case the avatar code is hosted on the same site as the blog or forum
post in which it is rendered, care should be taken that the script can not
access sensitive data like cookies, or perform unwanted operations like posting
additional comments.
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3.5 Third-Party Payment
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Figure 9: Composition with Third-Party Payment provider
3.5.1 General description
A mashup can choose to integrate a third-party payment component, which is
able to handle all payment transactions within the mashup. This relieves the
mashup developr and integrator from the burden of implementing multiple
payment systems (e.g. online accounts, debit or credit cards, ...), as well as
potential regulations associated with those payment systems.
A common way to use a third-party payment provider is by completely
delegating control of the browsing session to the third-party payment provider.
After having completed the transaction, the payment provider will transfer
the control back to the originating site, which can then further handle the
completion of the transaction. In a mashup scenario, the third-party pay-
ment provider is integrated as a component of the originating site. Instead
of transferring control of the entire session, the control of only one part of
the mashup will be delegated to the payment provider. This ensures the
continuous operation of the remainder of the mashup application.
Once the control is delegated to the payment provider, the payment
provider is responsible for executing the payment. How exactly this is imple-
mented is not important for the originating site. One example of a third-party
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payment service is PayPal, where a user has a membership account. Once
the user is authenticated, the user is able to approve the payment. Another
example of a third-party payment service is a front-end for different kinds
of online banking applications. A user approves a payment by generating a
response to a given challenge using a debit or credit card.
3.5.2 Technical description
The integration of the third-party payment component can be achieved by
embedding an iframe. Within this iframe, the originating site can delegate
control to the third-party payment provider. Outside of this iframe, the
mashup continues to operate as before. If supported, the mashup and pay-
ment provider can even communicate (using inter-window communication
techniques) while the control within the iframe has been transferred to the
payment service.
Delegating control back and forth is achieved using cross-origin commu-
nication. Since this communication takes place within an iframe, it is part of
the normal flow within a browsing context (i.e. loading documents). During
control delegation, already existing sessions are maintained using traditional
session management techniques, such as cookies.
The workflow of delegating control to a third-party payment provider and
then back to the originating site are shown in Figure 12.
3.5.3 Requirements
In the third-party payment provider scenario, there are three stakeholders:
the site integrating the payment service, the payment provider itself and
the end-user. Each of these stakeholders share a different set of security
requirements.
A first important security requirement is the secure integration of the
payment service into the mashup. This secure integration relies both on
isolation and the principle of least privilege. The payment provider needs
to be isolated from the rest of the mashup, but delegating control back and
forth needs to remain possible.
A second security requirement is to protect the payment provider (and
thus the end-user) from unwanted cross-origin traffic. Cross-origin traffic re-
lated to delegating control from the originating site to the payment provider
is considered legitimate, but other traffic is considered to be potentially
harmful. Similarly, the originating site (and thus the end user) needs to be
protected against unwanted cross-origin traffic as well. Again, transferring
control back from the payment provider to the originating site is considered
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Figure 10: Third-Party Payment Workflow Overview (PayPal)
legitimate, but other traffic is not. Note that this includes traffic from the
payment provider in cases where the originating site has no pending delega-
tions for which control can be transferred back.
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3.6 Third-Party Authentication
Figure 11: Third-Party Authentication
3.6.1 General description
Using a third-party authentication provider is an easy way to integrate an
authentication mechanism, and greatly increases the usability of the applica-
tion (e.g. no new username/password combination for users to remember).
A concrete example of third-party authentication providers are OpenID im-
plementers.
A common way to use a third-party authentication provider is by del-
egating control of the browsing session to the provider. The provider will
allow the user to authenticate in any of the supported ways (e.g. username/-
password, token, electronic ID, etc.). After having authenticated the user,
the authentication provider will transfer the control back to the originating
site. The site can now continue loading the user profile, either with local
data or data obtained from the authentication provider. In a mashup sce-
nario, the third-party authentication provider is integrated as a component
of the originating site. Instead of transferring control of the entire session,
the control of only one part of the mashup will be delegated to the authen-
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tication provider. This ensures the continuous operation of the remainder of
the mashup application.
3.6.2 Technical description
The integration of the third-party authentication component can be achieved
by embedding an iframe. Within this iframe, the originating site can delegate
control to the authentication provider. Outside of this iframe, the mashup
continues to operate as before. If supported, the mashup and authentication
provider can even communicate (using inter-window communication tech-
niques) while the control within the iframe has been transferred to the au-
thentication service. After authentication, the other mashup components can
start loading user-specific content or services.
Delegating control back and forth is achieved using cross-origin commu-
nication. Since this communication takes place within an iframe, it is part of
the normal flow within a browsing context (i.e. loading documents). During
control delegation, already existing sessions are maintained using traditional
session management techniques, such as cookies.
HOOFDSTUK 2. SINGLE SIGN-ON MET BEHULP VAN HET SHIBBOLETH
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Figuur 2.3: Communicatiestappen tussen de verschillende Shibboleth componenten
3. Als de client de WAYF component contacteert, stuurt deze meestal een HTML pagina
met een keuzelijst naar de client zodat de gebruiker zijn organisatie kan aanduiden. De
WAYF component kan ook op basis van andere factoren zijn beslissing nemen naar welke
IdP hij een bepaalde gebruiker doorstuurt. Zo kunnen bv. alle clients in de K.U.Leuven
IP-range automatisch doorgestuurd worden naar de IdP van de K.U.Leuven, terwijl
anderen een keuzelijst te zien krijgen. Dit wil uiteraard niet zeggen dat iemand die zich
in de K.U.Leuven IP-range bevindt enkel kan inloggen op de IdP van de K.U.Leuven.
De WAYF kan altijd omzeild worden aangezien dit simpelweg niet meer doet dan een
gewone redirect.
4. Indien de WAYF component een HTML pagina heeft doorgestuurd naar de gebruiker,
dan wordt het antwoord van de gebruiker terug naar de WAYF gestuurd. Deze zal dan
op basis van het antwoord van de gebruiker een beslissing nemen welke IdP de gebruiker
wil gebruiken.
5. Als de WAYF de beslissing heeft genomen naar welke IdP wordt doorverwezen, dan
stuurt deze een HTTP redirect (code 302) terug naar de client, die op zijn beurt de IdP
zal contacteren.
6. Wanneer de client de IdP contacteert, dan komt hij terecht bij de HS module van
Shibboleth. HS staat voor Handle Service, het hart van de IdP. Deze module maakt
namelijk handles waarmee de SP later attributen kan opvragen. Maar eerst moeten
niet-ingelogde gebruikers het onderliggend Single Sign-On systeem passeren dat gebruikt
wordt door de IdP. In het geval van de K.U.Leuven is dit CAS. CAS implementeert een
CAS filter die voor de Handler Service wordt geplaatst in Tomcat. Afhankelijk van de
implementatie van het SSO systeem kunnen er verschillende acties ondernomen worden.
In dit voorbeeld bespreken we de situatie waarin CAS gebruikt wordt als onderliggend
Figure 12: Third-Party Au he tication Workflow Ov rview (Shibboleth)
3.6.3 Require e ts
In the third-party authentication provider scenario, there are three stake-
holders: the site integrating the authenticatio service, the authentication
provider itself and the end-user. Each of these stakeholders share a different
set of security requirements.
A first important security requirement is the secure integration of the
authentication component into the mashup. This secur int rat on relies
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both on isolation and the principle of least privilege. The authentication
provider obviously needs to be isolated from the rest of the mashup, but
delegating control back and forth needs to remain possible.
A second security requirement is to protect the authentication provider
(and thus the end-user) from unwanted cross-origin traffic. Cross-origin traf-
fic related to delegating control from the originating site to the authentication
provider is considered legitimate, but other traffic is considered to be poten-
tially harmful. Similarly, the originating site (and thus the end user) needs
to be protected against unwanted cross-origin traffic as well. Again, transfer-
ring control back from the authentication provider to the originating site is
considered legitimate, but other traffic is not. Note that this includes traffic
from the authentication provider in cases where the originating site has no
pending delegations for which control can be transferred back.
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3.7 Holiday Pictures Mashup
Figure 13: Holiday pictures mashup example
3.7.1 General description
This scenario combines a few of the previous scenarios into a bigger mashup.
Consider a holiday pictures mashup consisting of three third-party com-
ponents integrated with some glue code as depicted in Figure 13: a gallery
component that stores the pictures, a photo editor component that can be
used to edit the pictures and a map component used to draw geotagging
information on a world map.
In the gallery component, a user can view, upload and organize pictures.
Pictures in the gallery component are stored on a remote server and accessed
through an API. But it is also possible to store copies of pictures locally in
the browser, so that the user may preview or edit them first. Once the user
is ready to publish the pictures, they are transferred to the remote server.
The photo editor allows a user to make changes to a photo. These changes
could e.g. be resizing or cropping, adjusting white-balance, applying image
filters, adding a caption, altering some meta-data, . . . etc. Pictures are
loaded into the photo editor from local storage only, so that the editor can
be used even when there is no access to the internet. Likewise, edited photos
are saved back to local storage.
The map component uses geotagging information to organize photos ge-
ographically on a world map. Photos store meta-data about the conditions
under which they were taken: lighting conditions, aperture size, the type
of camera, . . . and also GPS coordinates of the location where the photo
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was taken. The map component uses the geotagging information of selected
photos to draw markers or thumbnails on a map. When photos are displayed
on a map in this fashion, a user can easily see which photos belong together
and group them e.g. by holiday trip.
3.7.2 Technical description
The gallery component stores and retrieves photos using an online photo
gallery application like PhotoBucket [12]. To this end it must be able to
contact the PhotoBucket API through e.g. XMLHttpRequest [36], read and
write photos from and to disk through the File API[22], and make use of
local storage [34] to store a local data cache.
The photo editor component, similar to Pixastic [14], can be used to edit
photos within the gallery. This component does not need to communicate
with any remote API. Its functionality can be implemented completely in
JavaScript by making use of an HTML 5 canvas element. Photos are loaded
into the editor from local storage only.
The map component displays images in the gallery on a world map e.g.
using Google Maps [5] and positions them based on their geotagging in-
formation. Communication with the Google Maps API is essential for this
component. Optionally, this component can also retrieve the current loca-
tion of the user through Geolocation, and position a marker on the map to
indicate where the user is in relationship to the other markers.
Components communicate with eachother via the glue code through an
inter-frame communication mechanism (e.g. postMessage [6]) in case of
iframe-integration, or via direct function calls or data manipulation in case
of script inclusion [3]. The gallery and photo editor components communi-
cate to indicate which photos are to be edited or have been altered. The
gallery component communicates to the map component to indicate where a
marker should be placed on the map and what it should look like. There is
no communication between the photo editor and the map component.
In addition to the inter-frame communication via the gluecode, the gallery
and photo editor components share a local storage database to exchange large
images. To edit an image in the gallery component, it must be saved to local
storage and then accessed in the photo editor component. Once edited, the
image is stored in local storage where it is then available to both components.
3.7.3 Requirements
In this larger scenario, there are 5 security stakeholders: the provider hosting
the mashup’s gluecode, the 3 component providers and the end-user. All
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Glue code
Photo
editor Gallery GMaps
GeolocationlocalStorage File API
API
Figure 14: Holiday pictures mashup: interactions between gluecode, compo-
nents and browser functionality
components are integrated via iframes and so the same-origin policy takes
care of a lot of security problems.
As shown in Figure 14, none of the 3 components requires the ability to
directly contact any other component, but they must all be able to commu-
nicate with the glue code. All components must be able to interact with the
user through keyboard- and mouse-events and have access to their DOM.
The gallery component must be able to contact its remote API and make
use of local storage to store and retrieve holiday pictures. The photo editor
component does not need to contact any external API, since it is completely
implemented as a clientside JavaScript application, but it must also be able
to access local storage. Finally, like in Subsection 3.1, the map component
also requires the ability to communicate with its remote API. In addition the
map component should be able to access Geolocation information.
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4 Secure composition policies
In this section, two secure composition policies will be defined to secure
mashup compositions.
The first policy, the least-privilege composition policy, expresses the exe-
cution constraints to securely execute third-party components, i.e. the policy
specifies the minimum set of privileges allowed by the component. This maps
back to the security-sensitive operations (discussed in Section 2), and includes
both behavioral as well as communication constraints.
To cope with more advanced communication constraints between coop-
erative mashup components (as is the case in the third-party authentication
and third-party payment scenario), the trusted delegation policy will be de-
fined. This second policy captures an often recurring communication pattern
between cooperative components, which can only be coarse-grained guarded
with the least-privilege composition policy. With the trusted delegation pol-
icy, a one-to-one mapping can be achieved between cooperative components
giving back-and-forward control to each other.
Finally, this section briefly considers some first steps in studying compo-
sition of information flow properties – connecting WP3 and 4.
4.1 Least-privilege composition policy
Current mashup integration techniques either impose no restrictions on the
execution of a third party component, or simply rely on the Same-Origin
Policy. A least-privilege approach, in which a mashup integrator can restrict
the functionality available to each component, can not be implemented using
the current integration techniques, without ownership over the component’s
code.
Instead, a new client-side security architecture is needed that enables
least-privilege integration of components into a web mashup, based on high-
level policies that restrict the available functionality in each individual com-
ponent. Such a policy language can be synthesized from our study and
categorization of sensitive operations in the upcoming HTML 5 JavaScript
APIs (See Section 2).
4.1.1 Least-privilege composition
Taking into account the attack vectors present in current mashup composi-
tions, and the increasing impact of such attacks due to newly-added browser
features, there is clearly a need to limit the power of third-party mashup
components under control of the attacker.
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Optimally, mashup components should be integrated according to the
least-privilege principle. This means that each of the components is only
granted access to data or functionality necessary to perform its core func-
tion. This would enable the necessary collaboration and interaction while
restricting the capabilities of untrusted third-party components.
Unfortunately, least-privilege integration of third-party mashup compo-
nents can not be achieved with the current script-inclusion and iframe-
integration techniques. These techniques are too coarse-grained: either no
restrictions (or only the Same-Origin Policy) are imposed on the execution
of a third party component, implicitly inviting abuse, or JavaScript is fully
disabled, preventing any potential abuse but also fully killing desired func-
tionality.
To make sure that attackers do not exploit the insecure composition at-
tack vectors and multiply their impact by using the security sensitive HTML5
APIs described in Section 2, the web platform needs a security architecture
that supports least-privilege integration of web components. Since client-side
mashups are composed in the browser, this architecture must necessarily be
implemented in the browser. or at least execute in the client-side environ-
ment.
4.1.2 Composition policy
We have grouped the identified security-sensitive operations in the HTML5
APIs in nine disjoint categories, based on their functionality: DOM access,
Cookies, External communication, Inter-frame communication, Client-side
storage, UI & Rendering, Media, Geolocation and Device access.
For a third-party component, each category can be fully disabled, fully
enabled, or enabled only for a self-defined whitelist. The whitelists contain
category-specific entries. For example, a whitelist for the category “DOM
Access” contains the ids of the elements that might be read from or updated
in the DOM. The nine security-sensitive categories are listed in Table 1, to-
gether with their underlying APIs, the amount of security-sensitive functions
in each API, and their whitelist types.
The secure composition policy expresses the restrictions for each of the
security-sensitive categories, and an example policy is shown below. Unspec-
ified categories are disallowed by default, making the last line in the example
policy obsolete.
1 { " framecomm" : " yes " ,
2 " extcomm" : [ " goog l e . com" , " youtube . com" ] ,
3 " dev i ce " : " no " }
The full grammar of the policy file in EBNF is shown in Figure 15.
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Categories and APIs (# op.) Whitelist
DOM Access ElemReadSet, ElemWriteSet
DOM Core (17)
Cookies KeyReadSet, KeyWriteSet
cookies (2)
External Communication DestinationDomainSet
XHR, CORS, UMP (4)
WebSockets (5)
Server-sent events (2)
Inter-frame Communication DestinationDomainSet
Web Messaging (3)
Client-side Storage KeyReadSet, KeyWriteSet
Web Storage (5)
IndexedDB (16)
File API (4)
File API: Dir. and Syst. (11)
File API: Writer (3)
UI and Rendering
History API (4)
Drag/Drop events (3)
Media
Media Capture API (3)
Geolocation
Geolocation API (2)
Device Access SensorReadSet
System Information API (2)
Total number of security-sensitive operations: 86
Table 1: Overview of the sensitive JavaScript operations from the HTML 5
APIs, divided in categories.
It is important to note that a mashup component can be used inside
another mashup component. In such a case, the functionality in the inner
component is determined by the policies imposed on enclosing components,
in addition to its own policy (if it has one). Allowing sensible cascading of
policies implies that “deeper” policies can only make the total policy more
strict. If this were not the case, a component with a less strict policy could
be used to “break out” of another component’s restrictions.
The semantics of a policy entry for a specific category can be thought
of as a set. Let V be the set of all possible values that can be listed in a
whitelist. The “allow all” policy would then be represented by the set V
itself, a whitelist would be represented by a subset w ⊆ V and the “allow
none” policy by the empty set φ. The relationship “x is at least as strict as
y” can be represented as x ⊆ y. Using this notation, the combined policy p
of 2 policies a and b is the intersection p = a ∩ b, since p ⊆ a and p ⊆ b.
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1 POLICY = "{ " , {(
2 DOMACCESSREADRULE | DOMACCESSWRITERULE |
COOKIESREADRULE |
3 COOKIESWRITERULE | EXTCOMMRULE |
INTCOMMRULE |
4 STORAGEREADRULE | STORAGEWRITERULE | UIRULE
|
5 MEDIARULE | GEOLOCATIONRULE | DEVICERULE
6 ) , " , " } , " } " ;
7
8 (∗ DOM Access ∗)
9 DOMACCESSREADRULE = ’ " domaccess−read " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | KEYSET) ;
10 DOMACCESSWRITERULE = ’ " domaccess−wr i t e " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | KEYSET) ;
11
12 (∗ Cookies ∗)
13 COOKIESREADRULE = ’ " cook ie s−read " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | KEYSET) ;
14 COOKIESWRITERULE = ’ " cook ie s−wr i t e " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | KEYSET) ;
15
16 (∗ External communication ∗)
17 EXTCOMMRULE = ’ " extcomm " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | DOMAINSET) ;
18
19 (∗ Inte r f rame communication ∗)
20 INTCOMMRULE = ’ " framecomm " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | DOMAINSET) ;
21
22 (∗ Local s t o rage ∗)
23 STORAGEREADRULE = ’ " storage−read " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | KEYSET) ;
24 STORAGEWRITERULE = ’ " storage−wr i t e " ’ , IS , (BOOLEAN | KEYSET) ;
25
26 (∗ UI and Rendering ∗)
27 UIRULE = ’ " u i " ’ , IS , BOOLEAN;
28
29 (∗ Media ∗)
30 MEDIARULE = ’ " media " ’ , IS , BOOLEAN;
31
32 (∗ Geolocat ion ∗)
33 GEOLOCATIONRULE = ’ " g eo l o c a t i on " ’ , IS , BOOLEAN;
34
35 (∗ Device Access ∗)
36 DEVICERULE = ’ " dev i c e " ’ , IS , KEYSET;
37
38 IS = " : " ;
39 BOOLEAN = ’ " yes " ’ | ’ " no " ’ ;
40 KEYSET = " [ " , QELEM, { " , " , QELEM} , " ] " ;
41 DOMAINSET = " [ " , QDOMAIN, { " , " , QDOMAIN} , " ] " ;
42
43 QDOMAIN = ’ " ’ , DOMAIN, ’ " ’ ;
44 DOMAIN = ALPHA, {ALPHA | " . " } , ALPHA;
45
46 QELEM = ’ " ’ , ELEM, ’ " ’ ;
47 ELEM = ALPHA, {ALPHA} ;
48
49 ALPHA = ’a ’ | ’b ’ | ’ c ’ | ’d ’ | ’ e ’ | ’ f ’ | ’ g ’ | ’h ’ | ’ i ’
| ’ j ’ |
50 ’k ’ | ’ l ’ | ’m’ | ’n ’ | ’ o ’ | ’p ’ | ’ q ’ | ’ r ’ | ’ s ’
| ’ t ’ |
51 ’u ’ | ’ v ’ | ’w’ | ’ x ’ | ’ y ’ | ’ z ’ ;
Figure 15: EBNF notation of the policy syntax
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4.2 Trusted delegation policy between cooperative com-
ponents
To cope with more advanced communication constraints between coopera-
tive mashup components (as is the case in the third-party authentication and
third-party payment scenario), the trusted delegation policy proposes a more
fine-grained policy on cross-domain communication than the least-privilege
composition policy. By doing so, the trusted delegation policy captures an of-
ten recurring communication pattern between cooperative components, and
achieve a secure one-to-one mapping between cooperative components giv-
ing back-and-forward control to each other. The policy protects stakeholders
against cross-origin traffic, other than the legitimate traffic, i.e. the pol-
icy is able to make the distinction trusted cross-domain communication and
potentially harmful cross-origin traffic.
4.2.1 Basic policy
The core idea of our policy is the following: client-side state (i.e. session
cookie headers and authentication headers) is stripped from all cross-origin
requests, except for expected requests. A cross-origin request from origin A
to B is expected if B previously (earlier in the browsing session) delegated to
A. We say that B delegates to A if B either issues a POST request to A, or
if B redirects to A using a URI that contains parameters.
The rationale behind this core idea is that (1) non-malicious collaboration
scenarios follow this pattern [4], and (2) it is hard for an attacker to trick
A into delegating to a site of the attacker: forcing A to do a POST or
parametrized redirect to an evil site E requires the attacker to either identify
a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in A, or to break into A’s webserver.
In both these cases, A has more serious problems than a cross-origin attack.
Obviously, a GET request from A to B is not considered a delegation, as
it is very common for sites to issue GET requests to other sites, and as it
is easy for an attacker to trick A into issuing such a GET request (see for
instance attack scenario A2 in [4]).
4.2.2 Redirects
Unfortunately, the elaboration of this simple core idea is complicated some-
what by the existence of HTTP redirects. A web server can respond to a
request with a redirect response, indicating to the browser that it should re-
send the request elsewhere, for instance because the requested resource was
moved. The browser will follow the redirect automatically, without user in-
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tervention. Redirects are used widely and for a variety of purposes, so we
cannot ignore them. For instance, both non-malicious scenarios in [4] heavily
depend on the use of redirects. In addition, attacker-controlled websites can
also use redirects in an attempt to bypass client-side protection. Akhawe
et al. [1] discuss several examples of how attackers can use redirects to at-
tack web applications, including an attack against a CSRF countermeasure.
Hence, correctly dealing with redirects is a key requirement for security.
4.2.3 Filtering algorithm
The flowgraph in Figure 16 summarizes our filtering algorithm. For a given
request, it determines what session state (cookies and authentication head-
ers) the browser should attach to the request. The algorithm differentiates
between simple requests and requests that are the result of a redirect.
Simple Requests Simple requests that are not cross-origin, as well as
expected cross-origin requests are handled as unprotected browsers handle
them today. The browser automatically attaches the last known client-side
state associated with the destination origin (point 1). The browser does not
attach any state to non-expected cross-origin requests (point 3).
Redirect Requests If a request is the consequence of a redirect response,
then the algorithm determines if the redirect points to the origin where the
response came from. If this is the case, the client-side state for the new
request is limited to the client-side state known to the previous request (i.e.
the request that triggered this redirect) (point 2). If the redirect points
to another origin, then, depending on whether this cross-origin request is
expected or not, it either gets session-state automatically attached (point 1)
or not (point 3).
When Is a Request Expected? A key element of the algorithm is deter-
mining whether a request is expected or not. As discussed above, the intuition
is: a cross-origin request from B to A is expected if and only if A first dele-
gated to B by issuing a POST request to B, or by a parametrized redirect to
B. Our algorithm stores such trusted delegations, and an assumption that we
rely on (and that we refer to as the trusted-delegation assumption) is that sites
will only perform such delegations to sites that they trust. In other words, a
site A remains vulnerable to attacks from origins to which it delegates. We
provide experimental evidence for this assumption in a moment.
The algorithm to decide whether a request is expected goes as follows.
FP7-ICT-2009-5
Project No. 256964
D4.1: Secure composition policies 43/73
sameOrigin(ctx, dst)
Redirect?
Expected?
sameOrigin(last, dst) 2. State FromPrevious Request
3. No State
1. State from Origin
yes yes
yes
yes
no
no
no no
Figure 16: The request filtering algorithm
For a simple cross-origin request from site B to site A, a trusted delegation
from site A to B needs to be present in the delegation store.
For a redirect request that redirects a request to origin Y (light gray)
to another origin Z (dark gray) in a browsing context associated with some
origin α, the following rules apply.
1. First, if the destination (Z) equals the source (i.e. α = Z) (Figure 17a),
then the request is expected if there is a trusted delegation from Z to
Y in the delegation store. Indeed, Y is effectively doing a cross-origin
request to Z by redirecting to Z. Since the browsing context has the
same origin as the destination, it can be expected not to manipulate
redirect requests to misrepresent source origins of redirects (cfr. next
case).
2. Alternatively, if the destination (Z) is not equal to the source (i.e.
α 6= Z) (Figure 17b), then the request is expected if there is a trusted
delegation from Z to Y in the delegation store, since Y is effectively
doing a cross-origin request to Z. Now, the browsing context might
misrepresent source origins of redirects by including additional redirect
hops (origin X (white) in Figure 17c). Hence, our decision to classify
the request does not involve X.
Finally, our algorithm imposes that expected cross-origin requests can
only use the GET method and that only two origins can be involved in
the request chain. These restrictions limit the potential power an attacker
might have, even if the attacker successfully deceives the trusted-delegation
mechanism.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 17: Complex cross-origin redirect scenarios
# requests POST redir.
Third party service mashups 29.282 (52,95%) 5.321 23.961
Advertisement services 22.343 (40,40%) 1.987 20.356
Gadget provider services (appspot, mochibot, gmodules, . . . ) 2.879 (5,21%) 2.757 122
Tracking services (metriweb, sitestat, uts.amazon, . . . ) 2.864 (5,18%) 411 2.453
Single Sign-On services (Shibboleth, Live ID, OpenId, . . . ) 1.156 (2,09%) 137 1.019
3rd party payment services (Paypal, Ogone) 27 (0,05%) 19 8
Content sharing services (addtoany, sharethis, . . . ) 13 (0,02%) 10 3
Multi-origin websites 13.973 (25,27%) 198 13.775
Content aggregators 8.276 (14,97%) 0 8.276
Feeds (RSS feeds, News aggregators, mozilla fxfeeds, . . . ) 4.857 (8,78%) 0 4.857
Redirecting search engines (Google, Comicranks, Ohnorobot) 3.344 (6,05%) 0 3.344
Document repositories (ACM digital library, dx.doi.org, . . . ) 75 (0,14%) 0 75
False positives (wireless network access gateways) 1.215 (2,20%) 12 1.203
URL shorteners (gravatar, bit.ly, tinyurl, . . . ) 759 (1,37%) 0 759
Others (unclassified) 1.795 (3,24%) 302 1.493
Total number of 3rd party delegation initiators 55.300 (100%) 5.833 49.467
Table 2: Analysis of the trusted-delegation assumption in a real-life data set
of 4.729.217 HTTP requests
4.2.4 Experimental validation of the policy
The policy protects against illegitimate cross-origin traffic, but relies on the
correct identification of a site delegating control. The experimental analysis
below shows that only 1.17% of the requests in the data set are considered a
false positive (i.e. seen as a delegation when they are not a delegation).
We conducted an extensive traffic analysis using a real-life data set of
4.729.217 HTTP requests, collected from 50 unique users over a period of
10 weeks. The analysis revealed that 1.17% of the 4.7 million requests are
treated as delegations in our approach. We manually analyzed all these
55.300 requests, and classified them in the interaction categories summarized
in Table 2.
For each of the categories, we discuss the resulting attack surface:
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Third party service mashups. This category consists of various third party
services that can be integrated in other websites. Except for the single
sign-on services, this is typically done by script inclusion, after which
the included script can launch a sequence of cross-origin GET and/or
POST requests towards offered AJAX APIs. In addition, the service
providers themselves often use cross-origin redirects for further delega-
tion towards content delivery networks.
As a consequence, the origin A including the third-party service S be-
comes vulnerable to cross-origin traffic from S. This attack surface is
unimportant, as in these scenarios, S can already attack A through
script inclusion, which offers much more power than a cross-origin at-
tack.
In addition, advertisement service providers P that further redirect to
content delivery services D are vulnerable to cross-origin attacks from
D whenever a user clicks an advertisement. Again, this attack surface
is unimportant: the delegation from P to D correctly reflects a level of
trust that P has in D, and P and D will typically have a legal contract
or SLA in place.
Multi-origin websites. Quite a number of larger companies and organiza-
tions have websites spanning multiple origins (such as live.com - mi-
crosoft.com and google.be - google.com). Cross-origin POST requests
and redirects between these origins make it possible for such origins
to attack each other. For instance, google.be could attack google.com.
Again, this attack surface is unimportant, as all origins of such a multi-
origin website belong to a single organization.
Content aggregators. Content aggregators collect searchable content and
redirect end-users towards a specific content provider. For news feeds
and document repositories (such as the ACM digital library), the set
of content providers is typically stable and trusted by the content ag-
gregator, and therefore again a negligible attack vector.
Redirecting search engines register the fact that a web user is following a
link, before redirecting the web user to the landing page (e.g. as Google
does for logged in users). Since the entries in the search repository
come from all over the web, our policy provides little protection for
such search engines. Our analysis identified 4 such origins in the data
set: google.be, google.com, comicrank.com, and ohnorobot.com.
False positives. Some fraction of the cross-origin requests are caused by
network access gateways (e.g. on public Wifi) that intercept and reroute
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requests towards a payment gateway. Since such devices have man-in-
the-middle capabilities, and hence more attack power than cross-origin
attacks, the resulting attack surface is again negligible.
URL shorteners. To ease URL sharing, URL shorteners transform a short-
ened URL into a preconfigured URL via a redirect. Since such URL
shortening services are open, an attacker can easily control a new redi-
rect target. The effect is similar to the redirecting search engines; URL
shorteners are essentially left unprotected by our countermeasure. Our
analysis identified 6 such services in the data set: bit.ly, gravatar.com,
post.ly, tiny.cc, tinyurl.com, and twitpic.com.
Others(unclassified) For some of the requests in our data set, the ori-
gins involved in the request were no longer online, or the (partially
anonymized) data did not contain sufficient information to reconstruct
what was happening, and we were unable to classify or further investi-
gate these requests.
In summary, our experimental analysis shows that the trusted delegation
assumption is realistic. Only 10 out of 23.592 origins (i.e. 0.0042% of the
examined origins) – the redirecting search engines and the URL shorteners –
perform delegations to arbitrary other origins. They are left unprotected by
our countermeasure. But the overwhelming majority of origins delegates (in
our precise technical sense, i.e. using cross-origin POST or redirect) only to
other origins with whom they have a trust relationship.
4.2.5 Formal Modeling and Checking
The design of web security mechanisms is complex: the behavior of (same-
origin and cross-origin) browser requests, server responses and redirects,
cookie and session management, as well as the often implicit threat models
of web security can lead to subtle security bugs in new features or coun-
termeasures. In order to evaluate proposals for new web mechanisms more
rigorously, Akhawe et al. [1] have proposed a model of the Web infrastruc-
ture, formalized in Alloy.
The base model is some 2000 lines of Alloy source code, describing (1) the
essential characteristics of browsers, web servers, cookie management and the
HTTP protocol, and (2) a collection of relevant threat models for the web.
The Alloy Analyzer – a bounded-scope model checker – can then produce
counterexamples that violate intended security properties if they exist in a
specified finite scope.
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To model the trusted delegation composition policy, we needed to extend
the model of Akhawe et al. to include (a) the accessible client-side state at
a certain point in time, (b) the trusted delegation assumption and (c) our
filtering algorithm. More details on this extension can be found in [4].
We formally define a CSRF attack as the possibility for a web attacker
(defined in the base model) to inject a request with at least one existing cookie
attached to it (this cookie models the session/authentication information
attached to requests) in a session between a user and an honest server.
We provided the Alloy Analyzer with a universe of at most 9 HTTP events
and where an attacker can control up to 3 origins and servers (a similar size as
used in [1]). In such a universe, no examples of an attacker injecting a request
through the user’s browser were found. This gives strong assurance that
the countermeasure does indeed protect against CSRF, while non-malicious
scenarios (such as the third-party authentication and third-party payment
scenario) are indeed permitted. From this, we can also conclude that our
extension of the base model to express the trusted delegation composition
policy is consistent.
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4.3 Secure composition policies for the seven compo-
sition scenarios
To validate what these policies look like in practice, we have created example
policies for each of the scenarios described in Section 3.
4.3.1 Google Maps
The Google Maps scenario integrates only 1 component into a webpage with
gluecode: the Google Maps component. The policy for this component
should reflect that the component can communicate with its remote API,
have access to the DOM to render images and interact with the user.
1 {
2 " domaccess−read " : [ "gmapsDIV" ] ,
3 " domaccess−wr i t e " : [ "gmapsDIV" ] ,
4 " u i " : " yes " ,
5 " extcomm" : [ "maps . goog l e . com" ] ,
6 }
4.3.2 Facebook application
Once again, only one component is integrated: the third-party application.
Both toy-examples introduced in Subsection 3.2 basically share the same
policy: the application should be able to access the DOM, interact with the
user and make use of external communication to both the application’s API
and the Facebook API.
1 {
2 " domaccess−read " : " yes " ,
3 " domaccess−wr i t e " : " yes " ,
4 " u i " : " yes " ,
5 " extcomm" : [ "myapp . com" , " ap i . facebook . com" ] ,
6 }
However, the geolocation application should also be able to make use of
Geolocation:
1 {
2 " domaccess−read " : " yes " ,
3 " domaccess−wr i t e " : " yes " ,
4 " u i " : " yes " ,
5 " extcomm" : [ "myapp . com" , " ap i . facebook . com" ] ,
6 " g e o l o c a t i on " : " yes " ,
7 }
and the application using audiovisual media should be allowed to do that:
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1 {
2 " domaccess−read " : " yes " ,
3 " domaccess−wr i t e " : " yes " ,
4 " u i " : " yes " ,
5 " extcomm" : [ "myapp . com" , " ap i . facebook . com" ] ,
6 "media " : " yes " ,
7 }
4.3.3 Online Advertising
The Ads scenario also integrates only 1 component into a webpage with
gluecode: the ad itself. The ad should be able to read the DOM and write
to a specific part of it. It should also be able to communicate with its ad
network and interact with the user.
1 {
2 " domaccess−read " : " yes " ,
3 " domaccess−wr i t e " : [ "adDIV" ] ,
4 " u i " : " yes " ,
5 " extcomm" : [ " adnetwork . com" ] ,
6 }
4.3.4 Interactive Avatar
The only component being integrated in this scenario is the interactive avatar.
It should be able to write to the DOM, but not read from it. Interaction
with the user should be possible, and it should be able to contact the blog
or forum on which the user account exists.
1 {
2 " domaccess−read " : " no " ,
3 " domaccess−wr i t e " : [ " avatarDIV " ] ,
4 " u i " : " yes " ,
5 " extcomm" : [ " forum . com" ] ,
6 }
4.3.5 Third-Party Payment
The delegation from the mashup towards the payment provider and back is
enabled by the trusted delegation policy. Figure 18 shows a step-by-step flow
of control in which the delegation towards the payment provider takes place
(step 2). The payment provider transfers control back to the mashup in step
13.
According to the policy, the delegation in step 2 is legitimate, which
means that the provider is allowed to transfer control back to the mashup.
Every cross-origin request in this flow (step 2 and 4), except for the expected
request (step 13) is considered to be potentially harmful. This means that the
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Figure 18: Step-by-step flow diagram for third-party payment
policy will render these requests harmless by removing any attached client-
side state enabling session abuse. Step 13 is allowed by the policy, so when
the control is transferred back to the mashup, the presence of the client-side
state enables a clean delegation from the provider.
4.3.6 Third-Party Authentication
The delegation from the mashup towards the third-party authentication
provider and back is enabled by the trusted delegation policy. Figure 19
shows a step-by-step flow of control in which the delegation towards the
authentication provider takes place (step 4). The authentication provider
transfers control back to the mashup in step 14.
According to the policy, the delegation in step 4 is legitimate, which
means that the provider is allowed to transfer control back to the mashup.
Step 14 is allowed by the policy, so when the control is transferred back to
the mashup, the presence of the client-side state enables a clean delegation
from the provider.
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Figure 19: Step-by-step flow diagram for third-party authentication
4.3.7 Holiday Pictures Mashup
The Holiday Picture mashup consists of 4 components of which 1 is the
gluecode. The other 3 each require their own policy.
All components must be able to use inter-frame communication, but only
towards the gluecode. They must also be able to interact with the user and
access their DOM. All except the Pixastic component must be able to contact
their remote API. The PhotoBucket component requires access to client-side
storage and the GMaps component needs Geolocation functionality.
PhotoBucket policy:
1 {
2 " framecomm" : [ " i n t e g r a t o r . t l d " ] ,
3 " u i " : " yes " ,
4 " domaccess−read " : " yes " ,
5 " domaccess−wr i t e " : " yes " ,
6 " s torage−read " : " yes " ,
7 " s torage−wr i t e " : " yes " ,
8 " extcomm" : [ " photobucket . com" ] ,
9 }
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Pixastic policy:
1 {
2 " framecomm" : [ " i n t e g r a t o r . t l d " ] ,
3 " u i " : " yes " ,
4 " domaccess−read " : " yes " ,
5 " domaccess−wr i t e " : " yes " ,
6 }
GMaps policy:
1 {
2 " framecomm" : [ " i n t e g r a t o r . t l d " ] ,
3 " u i " : " yes " ,
4 " domaccess−read " : [ "gmapsDIV" ] ,
5 " domaccess−wr i t e " : [ "gmapsDIV" ] ,
6 " g e o l o c a t i on " : " yes " ,
7 " extcomm" : [ "maps . goog l e . com" ] ,
8 }
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4.4 Secure Composition for Information Flow Policies
We have also conducted some work which potentially links the present work
package and WP3 on information flow. We describe this briefly here.
The idea of building secure systems by composing “secure” components
is appealing, but this requires a definition of security which, in addition
to taking care of top-level security goals, is strengthened appropriately in
order to be compositional. For information-flow policies this is known to
be difficult because when components share resources, the way they interact
may influence information flows in profound ways.
Previously studies for compositional information-flow security of shared-
variable concurrent programs paid a high price for compositionality: a com-
ponent must be extremely pessimistic about what an environment might
do with shared resources. This pessimism leads to many intuitively secure
components being labelled as insecure.
Since in practice it is only meaningful to compose components which fol-
low an agreed protocol for data access, we take advantage of this to develop
a more liberal compositional security condition. The idea is to give the secu-
rity definition access to the intended pattern of data usage, as expressed by
assumption-guarantee style conditions associated with each component. We
have illustrated the improved precision by developing the first flow-sensitive
security type system that provably enforces a noninterference-like property
for concurrent programs.
More details on this work are provided in the paper Assumptions and
Guarantees for Compositional Noninterference published in CSF 2011 [10].
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5 Implementation strategies
In this section, we report on the early exploration of implementation strate-
gies to enforce secure composition policies. Various techniques have been
studied ranging from browser instrumentation, over browser extensions and
server-side JavaScript wrapping approaches, to a two-tier client-side archi-
tecture.
In particular, Section 5.1 proposes WebJail, a client-side security archi-
tecture that enforces the least-privilege composition policy, and discusses a
possible implementation strategy via a modified browser. In Section 5.2,
the trusted delegation policy is implemented as the default policy of the
existing browser extension CsFire. Section 5.3 discusses the feasibility to
wrap security-sensitive JavaScript operations as part of a server-side proxy,
and the security considerations to take into account to achieve full media-
tion. In Section 5.4, a two-tier architecture for sandboxed code is proposed
to combine a baseline sandbox with a stateful fine-grained policy, without
browser modification or restrictions on the supported scripts.
Thanks to this early exploration, first insights were acquired in the fea-
sibility and complexity of each of the implementation strategies. This early
exploration of implementation strategies will also further drive the selection
and development of enforcement techniques in the remaining tasks of WP4.
5.1 WebJail: least-privilege implementation
WebJail is a client-side security architecture that enforces the least-privilege
composition policy described in Section 4.1 via the use of deep aspects in
the browser. More details on WebJail are included in the WebJail paper[19],
which has been accepted at ACSAC 2011.
5.1.1 Architecture
The WebJail architecture consists of three abstraction layers as shown in
Figure 20. The upper layer, the policy layer, associates the secure composi-
tion policy with a mashup component, and triggers the underlying layers to
enforce the policy for the given component. The lower layer, the deep aspect
weaving layer, enables the deep aspect support with the browser’s JavaScript
engine. The advice construction layer in between takes care of mapping the
higher-level policy blocks onto the low-level security-sensitive operations via
a 2-step policy refinement process.
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Figure 20: The WebJail architecture consists of three layers: The policy
layer, the advice construction layer and the deep aspect weaving layer.
5.1.2 Prototype implementation
To show the feasibility and test the effectiveness of WebJail, we implemented
a prototype by modifying Mozilla Firefox 4.0b10pre. The modifications to
the Mozilla code are localized and consist of ±800 lines of new code (±300
JavaScript, ±500 C++), spread over 3 main files. The prototype currently
supports the security-sensitive categories external and inter-frame commu-
nication, client-side storage, UI and rendering (except for drag/drop events)
and geolocation.
Each of the three layers of the implementation will be discussed now in
more detail.
Policy layer The processing of the secure composition policy via the policy
attribute happens in the frame loader, which handles construction of and
loading content into frames. The specified policy URL is registered as the
policy URL for the frame to be loaded, and any content loaded into this
frame will be subject to that WebJail policy, even if that content issues a
refresh, submits a form or navigates to another URL. To ease up parsing of
a policy file, we have chosen to use the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON).
When an iframe is enclosed in another iframe, and both specify a pol-
icy, the combinatory rules defined in Subsection 4.1.2 are applied on a per-
category basis.
Once the combined policy for each category has been calculated, the list
of APIs in that category is passed to the advice construction layer, along
with the combined policy.
Advice construction layer The advice construction layer builds advice
functions for individual API functions. For each API, the advice construction
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layer knows what functions are essential to enforce the policy and builds a
specific advice function that enforces it.
The advice function is a function that will be called instead of the real
function. It will determine whether or not the real function will be called
based on the policy and the arguments passed in the function call. Advice
functions in WebJail are written in JavaScript and should expect 3 argu-
ments: a function object that can be used to access the original function, the
object on which the function was invoked (i.e. the this object) and a list
with the arguments passed to the function.
1 func t i on makeAdvice ( wh i t e l i s t ) {
2 var myWhitel ist = wh i t e l i s t ;
3
4 return f unc t i on ( o r i g f , obj , vp ) {
5 i f ( myWhitel ist . ROindexOf ( vp [ 0 ] ) >=0) {
6 return o r i g f . ROapply ( obj , vp ) ;
7 } else {
8 return fa l se ;
9 }
10 } ;
11 }
12
13 myAdvice = makeAdvice ( [ ’ f oo ’ , ’ bar ’ ] ) ;
14 r e g i s t e rAdv i c e (myFunction , myAdvice ) ;
15 d i s ab l eAdv i c eReg i s t r a t i on ( ) ;
Figure 21: Example advice function construction and weaving
The construction of a rather generic example advice function is shown in
Figure 21. The listing shows a function makeAdvice, which returns an advice
function as a closure containing the whitelist. Whenever the advice function
is called for a function to which the first argument (vp[0] in the example)
is either ‘foo’ or ‘bar’, then the original function is executed. Otherwise, the
advice function returns false.
Note that in the example, ROindexOf and ROapply are used. These func-
tions were introduced to prevent prototype poisoning attacks against the
WebJail infrastructure. They provide the same functionality as indexOf and
apply, except that they have the JSPROP_READONLY and JSPROP_PERMANENT
attributes set so they can not be modified or deleted.
Next, each (advice, operation) pair is passed on to the deep aspect weaving
layer to achieve the deep aspect weaving.
Deep aspect weaving layer The deep aspect weaving layer makes sure
that all codepaths to an advised function pass through its advice function.
Although the code from WebJail is the first code to run in a WebJail iframe,
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we consider the scenario that there can be code or objects in place that
already reference the function to be advised. It is necessary to maintain the
existing references to a function, if they exist, so that advice weaving does
not break code unintentionally.
The implementation of the deep aspect weaving layer is inspired by Con-
Script. To register deep advice, we introduce a new function called registerAdvice,
which takes 2 arguments: the function to advise (also referred to as the ‘orig-
inal’ function) and its advice function. Line 14 of Figure 21 illustrates the
usage of the registerAdvice function.
In Spidermonkey, Mozilla’s JavaScript engine, all JavaScript functions are
represented by JSFunction objects. A JSFunction object can represent both
a native function, as well as a JIT compiled JavaScript function. Because
WebJail enforces policies on JavaScript APIs and all of these are implemented
with native functions, our implementation only considers JSFunction objects
which point to native code1.
The process of registering advice for a function is schematically illus-
trated in Figure 22. Consider a native function Func and its advice function
Adv. Before deep aspect weaving, the JSFunction object of Func contains a
reference to a native C++ function OrigCode.
JSFunctionFunc
OrigCode
JSFunctionAdv
Trampoline
(a) Before weav-
ing
OrigCode
JSFunctionAdv
Trampoline
JSFunctionFunc
(b) After weaving
Figure 22: Schematic view of deep aspect weaving.
At weaving time, the value of the function pointer in Func (which points
to OrigCode) and a reference to Adv are backed up inside the Func object.
The function pointer inside Func is then directed towards the Trampoline
function, which is an internal native C++ function provided by WebJail.
At function invocation time, the Trampoline function will be called as
if it were the original function (OrigCode). This function can retrieve the
values backed up in the weaving phase. From the backed up function pointer
pointing to OrigCode, a new anonymous JSFunction object is created This
1Although WebJail could be implemented for non-native functions as well.
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anonymous function, together with the current this object and the argu-
ments to the Trampoline function are passed to the advice function Adv.
Finally, the result from the advice function is returned to the calling code.
In reality, the registerAdvice function is slightly more complicated. In
each JSFunction object, SpiderMonkey allocates 2 private values, known as
“reserved slots”, which can be used by Firefox to store opaque data. As shown
in Figure 22, the reserved slots of Func (hatched diagonally) are backed up
in the weaving phase together with the other values. During invocation time,
these reserved slots are then restored into the anonymous function mentioned
earlier.
Note that all code that referenced Func still works, although calls to this
function will now pass through the advice function Adv first. Also note that
no reference to the original code OrigCode is available. The only way to call
this code is by making use of the advice function.
To prevent any other JavaScript code from having access to the registerAdvice
function, it is disabled after all advice from the policy has been applied.
For this purpose, WebJail provides the disableAdviceRegistration func-
tion, which disables the use of the registerAdvice function in the current
JavaScript context.
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5.2 Trusted delegation implementation as an extension
to CsFire
The trusted delegation policy (described in Section 4.2) has been imple-
mented as part of the CsFire add-on for Firefox. The CsFire add-on protects
end-users from potentially harmful cross-origin traffic by applying the trusted
delegation policy we discussed earlier.
Firefox comes with an open architecture is fully aimed at accommodat-
ing possible browser extensions. Extension development for Firefox is fairly
simple and is done using provided XPCOM components [11]. Our Firefox
extension has been developed using JavaScript and XPCOM components
provided by Firefox itself.
To facilitate extensions wishing to influence the browsing experience, Fire-
fox provides several possibilities to examine or modify the traffic. For our
extension, the following four capabilities are extremely important:
• Influencing the user interface using XUL overlays
• Intercepting content-influencing actions by means of the content-policy
event
• Intercepting HTTP requests before they are sent by observing the
http-onmodify-request event (This is the point where the policy
needs to be enforced).
• Intercepting HTTP responses before they are processed by observing
the http-on-examine-response event
When a new HTTP request is received, the policy needs to be actively
enforced to render potentially harmful traffic harmless. Next to the trusted
delegation policy, the add-on allows explicitly defined exceptions to override
the default policy. Implementation of the trusted delegation policy requires
to keep track of delegations between sites, as well as redirects between origins,
which is achieved using an internal data store.
Enforcing an allow or block decision is straightforward: allowing a request
requires no interaction, while blocking a request is simply done by signaling
an error to Firefox. Upon receiving this error message, Firefox will abort
the request. Stripping authentication information is less straightforward and
consists of two parts: stripping cookies and stripping HTTP authentication
credentials. Cookies can easily be removed by editing the already present
Set-Cookie header. The header containing HTTP authentication credentials
however, is not yet available. Firefox can be instructed to leave out this
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header using the LOAD_ANONYMOUS flag, which is also used to provide
private browsing features.
The CsFire add-on is available via the Mozilla add-on platform, and has
been downloaded over 33.000 time since its release last year. Starting of
version 1.0, the trusted delegation policy, proposed in Section 4.2, is the
default security policy of CsFire.
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5.3 Safe Wrappers
Safe Wrappers is a hardened implementation of the lightweight self-protecting
JavaScript approach [13]. Lightweight self-protecting JavaScript is an en-
forcement mechanism which is implemented by inserting an enforcement li-
brary and policy code into a web page. The code wraps security-relevant
events of JavaScript in the web page with pre-defined policies so that the
security-relevant behaviour in the web page is monitored and controlled by
the policies, and thus the page becomes self-protected.
The injected self-protecting JavaScript code contains two parts: wrapper
code and policy code. The wrapper code is the enforcement mechanism im-
plementation which intercepts security-relevant events with a corresponding
policy. The self-protecting code is injected into the header of a web page;
the body of the page remains unchanged. Injecting the self-protecting code
into the header ensures that the self-protecting code is executed first, so it
gets to wrap the security critical events before the attacker code can get a
handle on them. The injection of self-protecting code can be performed at
any point between client (web browser) and server, e.g. at server, or at a
trusted proxy, or even as a browser plug-in.
The main challenges for implementing self-protecting JavaScript are com-
pleteness, ensuring that all security relevant events are intercepted, and
tamper-proofing, ensuring that the malicious code cannot subvert the monitor
mechanism itself. JavaScript provides reflection capabilities, in which code
can be loaded and executed at runtime using e.g. the eval or document.write
functions, which makes it difficult to provide completeness. Tamper-proofing
is another problem because the enforcement code is placed within the same
code base, therefore it can be overwritten by attacker code. The key point
to resolve these problems in self-protecting JavaScript is to ensure that the
original built-in methods can only be accessible via wrapper methods. Al-
though wrapper methods can be overwritten, the reference to the original
built-in method is held uniquely by the wrapper method.
Secure function and object prototype The attacker can modify a
global prototype so that it can subvert e.g. built-in methods, or policy ob-
ject. To prevent attacker code from subverting objects we can try to ensure
that each object reference used in the policy is a local property of the object
and not something inherited from its low-integrity prototype. The built-in
function hasOwnProperty can be used for this purpose (of course the in-
tegrity of the function hasOwnProperty must be maintained as well). But
this approach requires all object accesses to be identified and checked. This
is potentially tricky for implicit accesses, e.g., the toString-function is called
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implicitly when an object is converted to a string.
Since the monitor code is the first code to be executed it can store local
references to the original built-in methods used in the wrapping mechanism.
Our solution is to ensure that the wrapper code only uses the locally stored
copies of the original methods. As an example, o.toString() would be
rewritten as original_toString.apply(o,[]). To prevent an attacker from
subverting the apply function of the stored methods, it is made local to each
stored function by assignment, i.e. original_toString.apply=original_apply.
Now even if the prototype of the function is subverted, the apply function
local to the object remains untouched. Again, this is not entirely foolproof
since it could be hard to determine which functions are being called implicitly.
Full mediation A specific built-in may have several aliases pointing to the
same function in the browser. The wrapper must wrap all of these aliases to
have full mediation. The aliases include static and dynamic obtained from
other window object (window, frame, iframe). For static aliases, our safe
wrapping library compute the aliases in order to wrap all the aliases, and
ensure that a policy applied to one function is applied to all its static aliases.
For dynamic aliases, we provide pre-defined policies which enforce methods
that potentially return a window object.
Trap the caller-chain Caller-chain is an issue (in all major browsers)
where calling caller argument within a function returns a pointer to the func-
tion which called the current function. Thus any user code which is called
from within a built-in can obtain a pointer to that built-in using caller which
can be to restore the original built-in. We prevent this by wrapping opera-
tions on untrusted data in a dummy recursive function, the caller operation
can be prevented from reaching the sensitive context.
Safe policies The prototype chain problem also happen for policies when
a policy accesses e.g. a whitelist object which the attacker can have side-
effect by modifying the Object or Function prototype. Our solution is that:
for functions the policy writer must use local copies of the originals, and
for objects we can ensure that they cannot access a poisoned prototype by
simply removing it from its prototype chain. Our current implementation
is to provide a function called safe, which recursively traverses an object,
detaching it and all sub-objects from the prototype chain that can be modified
by the user. Detaching the object is done by setting its __proto__ property
to null. Since detaching implies that the object will no longer inherit any
of the methods expected to be associated with the type of the object, this
FP7-ICT-2009-5
Project No. 256964
D4.1: Secure composition policies 63/73
functionality needs to be restored. Since determining the type of an object
is difficult the safe function takes an optional argument to specify the type.
Safe versions of the functions associated with this type are added to the
object. The safe versions of the functions are stored locally and are detached
from the prototype chain to prevent attacker influence.
5.3.1 Declarative Policies
A policy regarding a call to a built-in may depend on the value of its pa-
rameters. But inspecting parameters may have side effects, and these side
effects are controlled by the untrusted caller but are executed in the context
of the policy code. We provide a policy calling mechanism which fix this
problem. The idea is that the policy writer writes a policy and an inspection
type for the argument and the result. The policy code can assume that the
parameters are declarative and the wrapper library will ensure this using an
inspection type. An inspection type is a specification of the types of the call
parameters that will be inspected by the policy code.
The parameter inspection type is an array of types. The following sim-
ple grammar of JavaScript literals represents the types used in our current
implementation:
type ::= ’string’ | ’number’ | ’boolean’ | ’*’ | undefined
| {field1 : type1, . . . , fieldn : typen}
The ’*’ type provides a reference to a value without providing access to
the value itself. We expect that experience will reveal the need for a more
expressive type language, such as sum-types and more flexible matching for
parameter arrays – but these should not be problematic to add.
Policies are enforced as follows: the inspection type is used as a pattern to
create a clone of the argument array. We will call this the inspection argument
array. This is the generalization of the idea of call-by-primitive-value, except
that the cloned parameters also remove any parts of the arguments which are
not part of the type. The policy logic can only access the inspection argument
array. However, when passing the parameters on to any built-in function, we
permit the function access to the whole of the argument array. To do this
we combine the original argument array with the inspection argument array.
Figure 23 illustrates this process and Listing 1 outlines the code.
When cloning, the reference type ’*’ is replaced by a fresh dummy object.
When combining, each such object is replaced with original value that it
represented. Note that the type language does not include functions. This
means that policy code cannot inspect any function parameters. However,
this does not mean that we cannot have policies on built-in functions which
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combine with 
original return value
argument array cloning by type:
policy.toString(b) === ’xyz’
a b        c
? ‘string’
? ‘xyz’
original argument array
inspection type
inspection 
argument array
Computation by policy code 
leading to call to 
invocation.proceed()
? ‘xy’      42
policy’s  modified
argument array
combine with 
original argument
a ‘xy’      42
Example policy computation for some built-in called with (a,b,c). In this example the policy inspects b at type string and 
removes the last character, and sets the third parameter to 42 before calling proceed() in order to access the original built-in 
function.  The foo field of the return value is incremented before it is returned to the caller. In the diagram ? is an abbreviation 
for undefined, and array objects are depicted as boxes.
pre-call policy code proceed function
original 
builtin
return inspection type
{ foo: ‘num’ }
{ foo: 0, bar: 2 }{ foo: 0 }{ foo: 1 }
return {foo:1}
{ foo: 1, bar: 2 }
final value returned by 
wrapper
inspection 
result
post-call policy code
Result cloning by 
type
Figure 23: Illustration of policy parameter manipulation
e.g. have callbacks as arguments – it just means that we cannot make policy
decisions based on the behavior of the callbacks. This restriction to “shallow”
types does not seem to be a serious limitation, but more experience is needed
to determine if this is indeed the case.
The treatment of the return value of the method is analogous to the
treatment of the arguments: a return type specifies what the policy may
inspect from the return value. If this is not specified then a return type of
* is assumed. The return value of the policy function is combined with the
return value produced by the actual built-in.
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1 var wrap = func t i on ( object , method , po l i cy , inType , retType ) {
2 // Find func t i on cor re spond ing to a l i a s
3 whi l e ( ! ob j e c t . hasOwnProperty (method ) && ob j e c t . __proto__)
4 ob j e c t = ob j e c t . __proto__ ;
5 var o r i g i n a l = ob j e c t [ method ] ;
6
7 ob j e c t [ method ] = func t i on wrapper ( ) {
8 var ob j e c t = th i s ;
9 var orgArgs = arguments , orgRet ;
10 var polArgs = cloneByType ( inType , arguments ) ;
11 var proceed = func t i on ( ) {
12 orgRet = o r i g i n a l . apply ( object ,
13 combine ( polArgs , orgArgs ) ) ;
14 re turn cloneByType ( retType , orgRet ) ;
15 }
16 var polRet = po l i c y ( polArgs , proceed ) ;
17 re turn combine ( polRet , orgRet ) ;
18 } ;
19 }
Listing 1: Outline of the revised wrapper function supporting inspection
types
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5.4 Two-Tier Sandbox Architecture
In this section, we present a work-in-progress which proposes an architecture
to load and execute untrusted JavaScript within a two-tier sandbox. The
idea of the two-tier sandbox architecture is to allow untrusted code to be dy-
namically loaded and executed without runtime checking or transformation.
The execution of untrusted code is enforced by fine-grained security policies
which can be specified modularly and specifically to each application.
Given a piece of untrusted JavaScript and an API, we can dynamically
load and execute the untrusted code, without static code validation2, trans-
formation or filtering, in a compartment created by a sandbox environment
recently developed by the Google Caja Team3 which allows untrusted code
to interact with a restricted API [17]. Similar to any other sandbox models,
the untrusted code can only interact with the outside environment through
the API provided to it by the sandbox.
We assume there exists an API library providing baseline access to the
hosting page, e.g. the Document Object Model (DOM). The soundness and
confinement properties of the API are assumed, and could, for example, be
established by an automated tool e.g. [17, 15]. The return value of an API
call is safe and has no side-effects. The API may implement some static
policies, such as sanitization of HTML input, which applies for any general
untrusted application.
Our goal is to specify and enforce modular and fine-grained policies on
such an API for specific untrusted applications. As an example, untrusted
code is allowed to call getElementById(..) method of a API document ob-
ject. If the document object provides capability of accessing the getElementById(..)
method, the untrusted code can call the method to access any element of a
page. In practice, a web master of a hosting page may enforce more re-
striction specific to the page. For example, (1) the untrusted code can only
call the function a limited number of specific whitelisted element IDs in the
hosting page, (2) the untrusted can call the function at most e.g. 3 times,
and (3) enforce further policies on the returned object, for example, allow
read-only for a critical element while allow full access to an element that is
assigned for the untrusted code to read and write.
In principle, such a fine-grained policy can be embedded within the imple-
mentation of the API. However, this makes the implementation too complex
and thus error-prone. Indeed, combining policy code with the implementa-
tion of a mediator object makes it difficult to maintain. Moreover, defining
a new policy or modifying an existing policy requires changing the imple-
2Apart from computing a cheap over-approximation of the code’s free variables
3http://code.google.com/p/es-lab/wiki/SecureEcmaScript
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mentation of the API. In addition, application-specific policies should be
defined and enforced for a particular untrusted code in one hosting page or a
cross different hosting pages. Therefore, it is also inflexible to include policy
definition and enforcement within the API implementation.
Our approach for policy enforcement in untrusted JavaScript is to sepa-
rate policy definition and enforcement from implementation of an API. Before
providing the API to untrusted code through a sandbox, the API is enforced
by specific policies predefined for the untrusted JavaScript. The policy en-
forcement is executed within a sandbox environment to ensure that the policy
code can only interact with the API and therefore can prevent crass policies
which may e.g. return a reference to the original DOM object. The enforced
API is returned and then provided as a usual API for the untrusted code
through another sandbox environment. This architecture is illustrated in
Fig. 24.
Sandbox running 
untrusted code, 
defined in a 
separate file e.g. 
`untrusted.js’
Sandbox running policy 
code, defined in a 
separate file e.g. `policy.js’
Base-line API 
implementation,
in e.g. `api.js’ file 
JavaScript  
environment, 
e.g. the DOM
The policy code can only 
access the base-line API and 
provided wrapper functions
The untrusted code can only
access objects returned by
the enforcement sandbox
Figure 24: The two-tier architecture
Deploying Untrusted Code Untrusted code in e.g. mashup applications,
is usually hosted by a third-party server, and embedded to a hosting page by
a <script> tag, i.e. <script src=‘http://mashup.org/code.js’>. To deploy
untrusted code into a hosting page using the proposed sandbox architecture,
the code must be first retrieved as a string in order to be executed within a
sandbox environment. There are several alternatives to get a mashup code
as a string: (1) Using the Uniform Messaging Policy (UMP) [38]: browsers
supporting UMP allow client-side JavaScript can request a content from a
cross domain source (2) Server-side support: server-side script may retrieve
FP7-ICT-2009-5
Project No. 256964
D4.1: Secure composition policies 68/73
a mashup source code and inject into the hosting page. In this work, we just
assume that the code can be retrieved and uploaded on the hosting server so
that it can be loaded at runtime using XMLHtmlRequest. The pseudo-code
in Listing 2 illustrates this deployment.
1 var api = . . . / / c r e a t e an API ob j e c t
2 // us ing XMLHtmlRequest to get the content o f f i l e
3 // ‘ po l i c y . j s ’ i n to ‘ pol icyCode ’ v a r i a b l e
4 var moduleMaker = cajaVM . compileModule ( pol icyCode ) ;
5 var enforcedAPI = moduleMaker ( api ) ;
6 load_untrustedCode ( enforcedAPI ) ;
7 func t i on load_untrustedCode ( api ) {
8 // us ing XMLHtmlRequest to get the content o f f i l e
9 // ‘ untrustedcode . j s ’ i n to ‘ untrustedCode ’ v a r i a b l e
10 var moduleMaker = cajaVM . compileModule ( untrustedCode ) ;
11 moduleMaker ( api ) ;
12 }
Listing 2: Template for enforcing policy for untrusted code in the two-tier
architecture
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6 Conclusion
This deliverable reported on the exploration of secure composition policies
in the context of mashup compositions with third-party components.
To better understand the impact of running arbitrary JavaScript code, the
upcoming HTML5 specification and accompanying APIs have been studied,
and a list of security-sensitive operations available to mashup components
has been enumerated
Next, seven relevant composition scenarios have been selected and ana-
lyzed. For each scenario, an informal functional description and the relevant
technical data on how the scenario is constructed has been described, as well
as an analysis of security requirements for the particular scenario.
In addition, two types of secure composition policies have been developed
to express both behavioral constraints as well as communication constraints
in mashup compositions.First, the least-privilege composition policy enables
the specification of allowed privileges granted to a mashup component, and
allows secure composition according to the least-privilege security principle.
Second, to capture recurring communication patterns between cooperative
mashup components (as is the case in third party payment as well as in third
party authentication compositions), the trusted delegation policy between
cooperative components specifies how an integrator can securely delegate
control back and forth to a third-party mashup component (e.g. for 3rd
party payment). As part of the validation, the two proposed policy types
have been applied on the seven small composition scenarios.
Finally, various implementation strategies have been explored to early
test the implementation feasibility of the two types of secure composition
policies, including the use of JavaScript wrappers, deep aspect technology in
the JavaScript engine, as well as browser extensions.
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